



National Council of Resistance of Iran
U.S. Representative Office

1747 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 1125, Washington, DC 20006
Tel: 202-747-7847; Fax 202-330-5346; info@ncrius.org; X: @ncrius

January 31, 2025

The Iranian regime is building nuclear warheads on missiles with a range of over 3,000 kilometers at two sites

- According to the Defense and Strategic Research Committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, based on reports by the network inside Iran of the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK), the Iranian regime is covertly focusing on the development of nuclear warheads intended for solid-fuel missiles with a range exceeding 3,000 kilometers, being manufactured at the Shahrud missile site in Iran.
- This project to develop nuclear warheads has historically been camouflaged as a space initiative, ostensibly aimed at launching communication satellites.
- However, the two facilities, previously recognized as rocket or space satellite launch sites, are now in full coordination with the regime's nuclear weaponization entity, the Organization for Advanced Defense Research (SPND)¹.
- The SPND is particularly dedicated to creating nuclear warheads for the solid-fuel Ghaem-100 missiles, which are equipped with mobile launch platforms at the Shahrud site, located 400 kilometers northeast of Tehran.
- SPND now has large-scale personnel and operations at the Shahrud site.
- Additionally, a missile facility on the outskirts of Semnan, approximately 220 kilometers east of Tehran, is working to produce liquid-fuel missiles with nuclear warheads.
- These reports, compiled from dozens of sources and thoroughly validated, indicate that in recent months, SPND has intensified its efforts to construct nuclear warheads at both the Shahrud and Semnan sites.

SPND Activity to Build a Nuclear Warhead at Shahrud Missile Site:

¹ The Farsi acronym for *Sazman-e Pazhouheshhaye Novin-e Defa'i*.

The Shahrud site, 35 kilometers southeast of the city of Shahrud on the edge of the desert, specifically focuses on research and experiments to build a nuclear warhead. **(Appendix 1)**

At this site, SPND's experts are working on a nuclear warhead for the Ghaem-100 solid-fuel missile with a range of more than 3,000 kilometers and a mobile launch pad.

SPND now has large-scale personnel and operations at the Shahrud site, and the experts of various SPND groups are working on different sections related to the development of nuclear warheads.

The Shahrud missile site, known in the area as "Imam Reza Base," is located in the southeast of the city of Shahrud, situated on the Ruyan-Dizej highway to the southeast.

Personnel vehicles are prohibited from entering the missile site. They are parked at the checkpoint at the entrance to the site, and the personnel are transported inside the site by the IRGC Aerospace Force vehicles.

The Ghaem-100 missile, with a mobile launchpad that enhances its military capability, was produced by the IRGC Aerospace Force and copied from North Korean missiles.

The production of the Ghaem missile was designed from the very beginning to carry a nuclear warhead. The IRGC Brigadier General Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam, the father of the IRGC's missile program, personally pursued the project.

In November 2011, while testing the first stage of this missile, Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam and dozens of IRGC missile experts were killed at the Modarres site in Tehran.

According to reliable reports from inside the IRGC, Brig. Gen. Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam visited the area south of Shahrud in 2009 to scout locations for a new IRGC missile site. He identified and approved the current site before the construction of the site started in Shahrud.

Approximately 18 kilometers from the site, beyond the sand factory, a road sign marks the area as a military zone, prohibiting entry and hunting. The site's security personnel detain unauthorized individuals who enter this road.

Most Shahrud missile site personnel are experts from the IRGC Aerospace Force and the SPND. They travel to the site by private car from Tehran and other cities.

The personnel handling service and support affairs are local IRGC members from the residents of Shahrud, the city of Ruyan, and the village of Dizej, located southeast of Shahrud. They commute to the site by bus and minibus.

According to this information, in the AMAD plan (the initial nuclear weaponization organ that was later changed to SPND), the IRGC planned to build a nuclear warhead for the Shahab-3 liquid-fuel missile. However, after 2009, the plan was focused on the Ghaem-100 solid-fuel ballistic missile with a range of 3,000 to 5,000 kilometers.

The focus on solid-fuel missiles coincided with the construction of the Shahrud site.

The land in this area has been taken from the Department of Environment in that region by the IRGC Aerospace Force. This project was implemented under the cover of the "Space Command" center by the Salman Farsi Space Command of the IRGC Aerospace Force.

This plan ultimately culminated in three successful Ghaem-100 missile launches over the past two years, enhancing the regime's capability to deploy nuclear weapons.

According to the regime's announced plans, the IRGC will test the more advanced Ghaem-105 missile in the coming months.

The ballistic missile tests of Ghaem-100 and Simorgh were conducted under the guise of satellite launches, as these missiles are described as "satellite carriers."

SPND's Activity to Build a Nuclear Warhead at Semnan Missile Site:

In addition to Shahrud, the SPND has intensified its activities at the Semnan missile site (located 70 kilometers southeast of the city of Semnan). Specialists from various groups within the SPND frequently visit this site to conduct their practical tests. **(Appendix 2)**

Research and tests at this site focus on the Simorgh missile, which uses liquid fuel and has a range of over 3,000 kilometers. This missile is also developed based on the design of North Korean military missiles. One of this complex's

most important extensive facilities is located in the northeastern part of the site, with a significant portion of the facilities underground.

Specifically, SPND specialists advance their projects using this extensive complex, which measures 750 meters by 500 meters.

Shams Omran, an engineering company affiliated with the Ministry of Defense, constructed this underground facility complex.

Expansion of the Semnan missile site aimed to produce nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles:

As previously disclosed, the regime planned to prepare five nuclear warheads, each yielding 10 kilotons of TNT, by 2003. After this initiative, known as the AMAD Plan, failed, the regime's Ministry of Defense began expanding the Semnan missile site to further its nuclear and missile programs.

The regime has attempted to conceal the expansion of the missile site in Semnan under the guise of the Imam Khomeini Space Launch Terminal. The site now includes eight complexes, compared to only two in 2005. Six additional complexes had been added by 2012.

Satellite imagery of a section of the facility located in the northeastern part of the site clearly shows that construction of this complex began in early 2005. Excavation work started in March 2009, the concrete foundations were made in October 2009, and by 2012, the site was completely covered with earth.

The covered hall is approximately 25 by 30 meters. According to various reports, it is connected to other facilities within the complex via underground tunnels.

According to reports from various divisions of SPND, including its geophysics group, which specializes in measuring underground explosions associated with nuclear warhead production, activity has intensified at the Semnan site.

The Geophysics Group of SPND, also known as the Chamran Group, was relocated to the Sorkheh Hesar site (north of the Khojir site in eastern Tehran) in 2017 and has continued its projects, including research on calculations related to the power of nuclear and underground explosions.

Recent reports indicate that the SPND Geophysics Group has secretly continued its research on underground experiments at the Semnan site. For practical tests, they utilize the desert areas south of the Semnan missile site.

Key specialists in this group include Mohammad Javad Zaker, Hamed Aber, and Farhad Moradiani Khosrowabad.

This department maintains close relationships with the International Institute of Earthquake Engineering and Seismology based in Iran, the Department of Geophysics at the University of Tehran, and the Department of Geophysics at Shahrud University.

It is evident that besides the Institute of Geophysics of the University of Tehran, Shahrud University is the only other university in Iran whose geophysics department actively collaborates with SPND. Notably, Shahrud, according to the 2016 census, has a population of only 218,000, marking it as neither a major nor a significant city in Iran.

To obscure the military purpose of the Semnan missile site, the regime named it the Imam Khomeini site of the country's space organization and conducted ballistic missile launches under the guise of satellite launches.

For instance, during the first launch of a “satellite carrier” missile on August 8, 2008, which failed, then President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was present. The regime invited the media to the test site to portray the missile launches as related to launching satellites.

However, witnesses at the scene reported that IRGC aerospace personnel were dressed in civilian clothes to conceal the military nature of the tests. At the end of the event, all photographs taken by journalists were confiscated, and after scrutiny by the IRGC's Intelligence Protection, only a limited number of photos were released to them.

Plans to conceal nuclear warhead tests and research:

The regime has established a unit within the SPND called the Directorate for Nuclear Treaties, operating under the supervision of the regime's Supreme National Security Council—the highest decision-making body on national security issues.

The directorate's primary mission is to conceal the activities related to the development of nuclear warheads and to feign compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

The experts of the SPND Geophysics Group maintain close contact with SPND's Directorate for Nuclear Treaties to address inquiries related to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Dr. Mohammad Sabzian, head of the SPND's Directorate for Nuclear Treaties, leads the Geophysics Group's activities. The group's goal is to conceal this section's operations.

The SPND Geophysics Group's specialists are organized into four groups: seismic, hydroacoustic, ultrasound, and radionuclide. All groups coordinate with this Directorate.

Dr. Sabzian directs the activities under the Directorate for Nuclear Treaties with oversight from the Supreme National Security Council. Sabzian is a colleague of Fereydoun Abbasi Davani, a key figure and one of the initial officials responsible for developing the nuclear weapons program in the AMAD plan and SPND organization.

According to the latest reports, in 2023, the Geophysics Group has significantly expanded at the Sorkhe Hesar site in eastern Tehran, initiating the construction of new facilities. **(Appendix III)**

Establishment of “Space Command” of the IRGC’s Aerospace Force:

In December 2012, the IRGC Aerospace Force began establishing the initial structure of what is now known as the Space Command, officially named The Salman Farsi Space Command. However, this organization was not announced until May 2020, allowing it to operate semi-secretly.

The IRGC Space Command oversees the activities at the Shahrud missile site, which have predominantly focused on developing solid-fuel missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. These activities have been conducted under the cover of satellite launches and the creation of a military space system.

IRGC Brig. Gen. Ali Jafarabadi, 50, has been a pivotal figure in the IRGC Aerospace Force, leading the formation of the Space Command since 2012. He has directed projects at the Shahrud site. According to the regime's internal reports, Brig. Gen Ali Jafarabadi replaced Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam to lead the development of ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads.

He later earned his Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering—Telecommunications from Tarbiat Modares University in Tehran in 2018.



IRGC Brig. Gen. Ali Jafarabadi

Jafarabadi works on space projects with two experts, Ali Shabani and Javad Salem, from Imam Hossein University. Over the past year, Jafarabadi has provided all public details about projects related to the Ghaem-100 missile. On September 10, 2024, the U.S. Treasury Department and the British government added Jafarabadi to their sanctions lists.

Conclusion:

New Data:

1. According to the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) network inside Iran, Tehran is covertly dashing toward the development of nuclear warheads for solid-fuel missiles with a range exceeding 3,000 km, manufactured at the Shahrud missile site in Iran.
2. Camouflaged as a satellite launching initiative, Shahrud and Semnan missile sites are now in full coordination with the regime's nuclear weaponization entity, the Organization for Advanced Defense Research (SPND).
3. SPND is particularly dedicated to creating nuclear warheads for the solid-fuel Ghaem-100 missiles, which are equipped with mobile launch platforms at the Shahrud site, and is using liquid fuel missile Simorgh to develop nuclear warheads in Semnan.

History of Deception:

1. The Iranian mullahs are masters of lies, deception, and evasion. According to a confidential internal memo, the regime seeks to buy time by negotiating with European countries and even indirectly with the U.S., aiming to maintain the current status quo to complete its weapons program. In this same memo, the regime expresses concern about possibly triggering the "snapback mechanism" at the UNSC. It plans to drag the situation for six more months, after which the sunset clause in UNSC Resolution 2231 would render it moot.
2. For over two decades, the regime has used negotiations and the West's leniency merely as a means to complete its nuclear programs. It has exploited talks to buy time, betrayed the international community's trust, and seriously threatened global peace and stability. The JCPOA legitimized the enrichment program and left out any means to scrutinize the weaponization of the fissile material as well as the missile program.
3. Since August 2002, when the National Council of Resistance of Iran exposed the regime's secret nuclear sites in Natanz and Arak, we have witnessed Tehran's consistent pattern of deception in negotiations with

the West, whose policies were built on appeasement. This is particularly important since Tehran never voluntarily came clean on its nuclear program.

The Way Forward:

1. This regime, widely rejected by its own people and weakened by the fall of Assad's dictatorship in Syria (its strategic depth), has intensified domestic repression through increased executions and simultaneously accelerated its nuclear weapons development.
2. Tehran has never been as weak, vulnerable, or desperate as it is today. The desperate Iranian regime is thus speeding up the development of nuclear weapons. Now is the time to hold the regime accountable for internal killings, regional warmongering, and nuclear weapons development.
3. As long as this regime is in power, it will never abandon its nuclear program, even if it makes tactical concessions. The only sure way to end the Iranian regime's threat is to end the rule of the clerics in Iran by the Iranian people and their organized resistance.

Action Plan for the International Community:

1. The snapback mechanism must be activated to reinstate the six UN Security Council resolutions against Iran. Lifting sanctions has only emboldened the Iranian regime, providing resources to accelerate its nuclear program.
2. All nuclear-related sites of the Iranian regime, including all uranium enrichment capabilities, must be shut down. The International Atomic Energy Agency must be granted unrestricted access to all of Iran's--declared and undeclared--nuclear facilities to monitor and verify the closing of such sites.
3. The global community must impose severe consequences for any further violations. Diplomatic overtures without accountability have only encouraged the regime's deceptions.

Appendix I

SPND Operations in Shahrud



Satellite imagery of various sections of the Shahrud missile site



Satellite imagery of entrance sections of the Shahrud missile site



close up of the image of the main entrance to the Shahrud site



Helicopter landing area near the entrance to the Shahrud site



A section of the Shahrud site where missiles are kept



The main section of the facilities in the Shahrud site



The region used for missile engine tests at the Shahrud site



Closer imagery of the region used for missile engine tests at the Shahrud site



Missile launch platform at the Shahrud site



Missile launch platform used by mobile launchers at the Shahrud site

Appendix II

SPND Operations in Semnan



The northern complex of the Semnan missile site in 2024



The northeastern complex of the Semnan missile site in 2024



Imagery of the 2005 Semnan site before construction of the northeastern section began




The Imagery of the 2009 Semnan site after the excavation of the northeastern section began



The imagery of the 2009 Semnan site after the start of the construction of concrete foundations




The imagery of the 2012 Semnan site after the underground facility was wholly covered with soil



Imagery of Semnan in 2005 (yellow were existing buildings) and (blue were unconstructed facilities)



Imagery of Semnan in 2024 (yellow are constructed buildings)



Simorgh missile modeled after North Korean UNHA-1 (left), the launch pad for Simorgh at Semnan site (right)

Appendix III

SPND Operations in Sorkhe Hesar



Sorkhe Hesar site (east Tehran) as exposed by the NCRI in 2020 (used by the Geophysics group of SPND)



Sorkhe Hesar site (east Tehran) used by the Geophysics group of SPND as expanded in 2023

These materials are being distributed by the National Council of Resistance of Iran - U.S. Representative Office. Additional information is on file with the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. NCRI-US acts as the Washington office for Iran's parliament-in-exile, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, dedicated to establishing a democratic, secular, non-nuclear republic in Iran. It will serve as a provisional government led by its President-elect, Maryam Rajavi, and based on her Ten Point Plan once the theocracy is ousted. Its primary responsibility will be to hold free and fair elections within six months after the regime's fall.