Female MEK motorcyclist Resistance Units paraded in Tehran on 20 Feb with a banner reading: “We can and we must”

Resistance Units: Iran’s Organized Resistance


The January 2026 uprising underscored the strategic role of the MEK Resistance Units in confronting the IRGC’s repression and advancing the Iranian people’s struggle for democratic change toward victory.

NCRI-US Commentary

WASHINGTON, October 29, 2026 – The January 2026 uprising marked a turning point in the Iranian people’s struggle for freedom and justice against the ruling clerical regime. Across the country, Iranians demanding regime change challenged a security apparatus prepared to use overwhelming force and firepower—and any means necessary—to preserve the regime’s hold on power.

The regime’s response was brutal. Thousands were killed, and mass arrests and executions followed. Yet the uprising also highlighted an increasingly important dimension of the struggle: organized resistance operating alongside a rebellious society.

At the center of this development are the Resistance Units, nationwide networks affiliated with the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), also known as the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), whose activities have evolved significantly over the past decade.

From Breaking Fear to Confronting Repression

The Resistance Units emerged around 2014 as part of the Iranian Resistance’s strategy to establish organized resistance networks inside Iran. Initially, they largely distributed political messages, displayed opposition banners, challenged regime propaganda, and demonstrated to a restive society that defiance remained possible despite pervasive surveillance.

Their central mission was to break what the Resistance calls the wall of repression – the fear that prevents citizens from acting collectively against authoritarian rule.

Today, the Resistance Units are at the core of a broader strategy based on the recognition that popular uprisings, however widespread, need an organized force to organize and sustain the uprising, counter infiltration and diversion by regime agents, and confront the regime’s repressive forces to strengthen protesters’ morale and prolong the uprising against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Basij, and other institutions of repression.

The need for the expansion of Resistance Units became especially evident during the uprisings of 2017–2018, November 2019, and 2022. The January 2026 uprising showed how society, especially the younger generation, has adopted this strategy.

According to Iranian Resistance accounts, protesters and local networks of Resistance Units across the country engaged security forces in numerous cities, with some neighborhoods and towns temporarily escaping the regime’s effective control.

The experience reinforced a central argument of the Iranian Resistance: mass uprisings are indispensable to ending clerical rule, but they must be complemented by a sustained and organized resistance network capable of overcoming an entrenched security apparatus.

A New Phase in the Resistance Units’ Evolution

The changing character of the Resistance Units is reflected in their increasingly courageous reported operations against the regime’s security and repressive institutions.

Their targets have included IRGC and Basij facilities, neighborhood security centers, and judicial institutions associated with political persecution and executions. The Resistance identifies these institutions – not civilians – as the intended targets of its operations.

In February 2026, the Iranian Resistance announced an armed operation involving approximately 250 resistance fighters against the Motahari compound, the headquarters of the regime’s then-Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The announcement marked a significant development in the movement’s capabilities inside Iran.

Even the regime’s own prosecutors, intelligence agencies, and state-affiliated media have repeatedly acknowledged the activities of MEK-affiliated networks, despite official efforts to dismiss the organization’s domestic influence.

The Decisive Factor Must Come from Within

Iran’s experience has repeatedly demonstrated the failure of attempts to reform the fundamentally irreformable Velayat-e Faqih system, as well as the limitations of relying on external pressure alone.

Sanctions are necessary because, when fully implemented, they can weaken the regime’s resources and constrain its activities. However, neither foreign military action nor sanctions can substitute for a domestically rooted movement of Iranians committed to achieving democratic regime change.

The Iranian Resistance’s strategy therefore rests on the interaction of popular uprisings, organized domestic resistance, and a democratic political alternative — the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) — whose 10-Point Plan for a democratic Iran is grounded in the sovereignty of the Iranian people.

The central lesson for the regime from the January 2026 uprising is that, despite the widespread killing of protesters, society is increasingly attracted to the MEK strategy of organized resistance inside Iran directed at the IRGC and repressive institutions. This explains why the regime has carried out a wave of executions of political prisoners since March 2026, especially those affiliated with the MEK or involved in confronting the IRGC during the January uprising.


About the Iranian Resistance

The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) is a coalition advocating a democratic, secular republic in Iran. Maryam Rajavi, the NCRI’s President-elect for the transitional period, has outlined a Ten-Point Plan for a future democratic Iran. The People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), also known as the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), is the NCRI’s principal organized movement.


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